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TAGS: [PREL](#) [PARM](#) [KNNP](#) [JA](#) [KS](#) [KN](#)  
SUBJECT: VCI SENIOR ADVISOR HEINTZELMAN AND ISN/RA SENIOR  
ADVISOR KANG DISCUSS NORTH KOREA WITH MOFA  
NON-PROLIFERATION DIRECTOR SUZUKI

Classified By: VCI Senior Advisor for Noncompliance Harry Heintzelman;  
reasons 1.4(b) and (d).

11. (C) SUMMARY. Bureau of Verification, Compliance and Inspection Senior Advisor for Harry Heintzelman, IV, and ISN Regional Affairs Senior Advisor Eliot Kang met with MOFA non-proliferation officials on April 7 to discuss potential areas of cooperation in dismantling North Korean nuclear facilities. Heintzelman briefed MOFA Director for Non-proliferation, Science and Nuclear Energy Satoshi Suzuki on his experience with dismantling Libyan nuclear facilities and removing sensitive documents and materials from that country. Heintzelman suggested that Japan may have valuable experience with dismantling graphite-moderated reactors that could facilitate operations in North Korea should the opportunity arise. Suzuki agreed that Japan could add real value to operations in North Korea, but cautioned that Tokyo was not yet in a position to determine to what extent Japan would be involved or the nature of its involvement. Heintzelman also briefed Suzuki on USG efforts to determine the best site for a base of operations for coordinating activities in North Korea and suggested the USG would likely want to use Yokota Air Base as a gateway for US teams. END SUMMARY.

12. (C) On April 7, VCI's Senior Advisor for Noncompliance Harry Heintzelman and ISN's Office of Regional Affairs Senior Advisor Eliot Kang met with MOFA Non-proliferation, Science and Nuclear Energy Division Director Satoshi Suzuki to discuss potential areas of cooperation in dismantling North Korean nuclear facilities. Heintzelman told Suzuki that a working group was established in the U.S. last fall but its work has been slowed somewhat by other proliferation challenges. Nevertheless technical experts have been working on the challenges presented by the denuclearization and verification of the DPRK nuclear and nuclear weapons program. For example, finding a single governing protocol for health and safety guidelines for nuclear facility inspectors operating in North Korea is a prime example of the type of challenges facing USG Departments and Agencies that will have to be resolved before plans can move ahead. There also are various domestic laws and acts that affect the activities which could arise during this effort. Heintzelman said, as

the working group is moving ahead in planning, it would be useful to learn the other Parties views and of their experience in nuclear-related dismantlement efforts.

¶13. (C) From the US's experience in Libya, Heintzelman argued that we must look at each facility individually to determine the best course of action for decommissioning and/or dismantling. The USG already is conducting such studies on known facilities and is consulting with its partners on how to implement plans. Heintzelman told Suzuki that Japan's experience dismantling a small graphite-moderated reactor at Tokai makes it uniquely qualified to provide information and ideas for planning how to dismantle the Yongbyon reactor in North Korea. Suzuki added that aside from the Tokai reactor, Japan also previously had decommissioned a light water reactor and a small pilot-scale enrichment facility. Suzuki said he supports holding technical talks in June to continue discussions along these lines.

¶14. (C) Suzuki continued that in order to determine the best course of action, all groups involved must consider how to handle North Korean hardware (facilities and material), software (documentation and personnel), as well as cooperation among the parties. North Korean issues are highly charged in Japan, but it is essential to have a firm timeline that realistically reflects the political and technical obstacles dismantlement operations would face in North Korea, according to Suzuki. Heintzelman emphasized the need to quickly identify and remove critical items from North Korea facilities; dismantling or removing any weapons would be the top priority. However, the pace of this effort would be dictated by DPRK's strategic decision to verifiably dismantle its programs and the cooperation the DPRK extended to the dismantlement and verification effort. Suzuki assured Heintzelman that Japan is not interested in being involved in

any weapons-related activities or in having access to sensitive weapons-related information.

¶15. (C) Suzuki noted that the GOJ assesses that the term "point of no return" potentially could offer North Korea an opportunity to stall on implementing its obligations and that Japan prefers instead the USG-favored "substantial degradation." Heintzelman told Suzuki that the issue of when there had been a substantial degradation of North Korea's nuclear weapons and nuclear program was not time driven but dependant upon North Korean cooperation and progress on dismantlement, elimination and verification. Suzuki noted that there would be political pressure for an expeditious implementation process and for substantial progress to be made at the one-year point; momentum that would be vital to keeping North Korea on track. Heintzelman agreed that an expedited process is preferable but it would depend on the North's behavior and the progress made on the ground.

¶16. (C) Suzuki asked whether the USG intended to enlist the help of other nuclear weapons states, particularly France and the UK, in CVID. Heintzelman responded that outside participation was an important factor to consider as plans move forward and that those states had unique expertise that could facilitate dismantlement and verification operations in North Korea. This was an issue that should be discussed further and broached with the other Parties. Responding to Heintzelman's question on where a multilateral entity to provide technical support to teams in North Korea should be sited, Suzuki noted that both China and South Korea would likely prefer to host such an entity. Although more discussion is needed, Suzuki suggested that Japanese politicians might wish Japan to play such a role. Suzuki also asked whether the USG intended to use U.S. bases in Japan as staging or storage areas for operations in Japan. Heintzelman replied that this issue was still under study but use of Yokota could be an attractive option. Suzuki said Japan generally was supportive of such use but would need to know the details and also would have to coordinate such use with other parts of the government.

17. (C) During a follow-on lunch, Suzuki mentioned that Iran and India currently are high priority issues for his office. Referring to the India civil nuclear agreement as "the India problem," Suzuki restated Japan's concerns that the agreement could set a double standard and potentially undermine the credibility of the NPT regime. (BIOGRAPHIC NOTE: Suzuki is very well spoken in English and very knowledgeable about international non-proliferation issues. Like most MOFA officials in the Disarmament, Science and Non-proliferation Department, Suzuki takes an almost puritanically legalistic approach to most non-proliferation issues, particularly with regards to the NPT. Suzuki tends to wait till the end of meetings to bring up more provocative issues, such as criticism of US policy or new GOJ positions. END NOTE.)

18. (U) Deputy Director for Non-proliferation, Science and Nuclear Energy Kenji Enoshita proposed meeting again with Heintzelman at a later date to discuss North Korean issues in more detail.

#### Participant List:

##### Japan:

Satoshi SUZUKI, Director, Non-proliferation, Science and Nuclear Energy Division  
Kenji ENOSHITA, Deputy Director, Non-proliferation, Science and Nuclear Energy Division  
Kaoru MAGOSAKI, Principal Deputy Director, Non-proliferation, Science and Nuclear Energy Division  
Takuya IWAMOTO, Special Assistant for North Korean Issues, Non-proliferation, Science and Nuclear Energy Division  
Hiroyuki SHIMIZU, Reprocessing Specialist, Japan Atomic Energy Agency, seconded to Non-proliferation, Science and Nuclear Energy Division

##### U.S.:

Henry Heintzelman, IV, Senior Advisor, VCI  
Eliot Kang, Senior Advisor, Regional Affairs, ISN  
Joyce Rabens, Minister-Counselor for Environment, Science and Technology, US Embassy Tokyo  
Matthew Wallace, Second Secretary, Environment, Science and Technology Affairs, US Embassy Tokyo

SCHIEFFER